Part 2
TWP follows with “Incident Command”. TWP gives “props” to French authorities in two particular noteworthy choices: not telling the people inside the stadium what had happened (suicide bombing) and a policeman at the Bataclan directly engaging an active shooter (thereby killing him). However, TWP addresses certain concerns with communication and unit cohesion. Having no centralized command, and separate command posts at that, caused confusion: radios were used between first responders to communicate with each other. When a centralized command post hijacked all radio comms, those on the scene(s) could not continue talking to each other. This hindered first responders to act in an aggressive, life saving manner. I feel that the autonomy of law enforcement is important in certain situations, particularly with fluid and ever evolving circumstances as a terrorist attack (again, harkens back to San Bernardino). This is reminiscent of the military: the command structure of the US military does not end at the elimination of it’s upper echelons. Command follows a downward structure when there is no other leader available, from a Colonel down to the most buck new private. The addition of medics in ERTs is an interesting aspect, and does provide an annal of support that a fireteam leader or a knockdown specialist could offer. Nevertheless, being fluid and able to adapt to any and all circumstances at the behest of the situation is the cornerstone to ending any and all confrontations. The one concern i have is medical support in “hot zones”: what is one medical personnel able to do with multiple large scale casualties? For southern California and the LA county region, incident command is not a huge issue. Shared and inter agency cooperation is commonplace and provides a strong element of defense against small scale attacks.
TWP next discusses “Crisis Information”, which is an aspect that the United States needs to buckle down on. There are too many times when a suspect can gather information from the television or internet (if applicable using a computer or cell phone). There have been instances where shooters who had hostages learned from outside news sources of impending police actions, and tried to change the situations to their benefit. The US, and in particular with the abundance of news organizations in southern California, a limit needs to be established of how much information news sources can get, and what information is relayed. Reddit has a policy where during live events such as terrorist attacks or shootings, that they limit the amount of information shared on the threads so that the perpetrators cannot utilize that information. There should be a form of continuation in limiting the amount of information regarding terrorist attacks and other similar situations. An overload of information can create false alarms and panic where they should not be panic (on 9/11 an incorrect alarm of an explosion at Capitol Hill during the morning of the attacks). Additionally, it is important that crisis information is relayed in a timely fashion: utilizing social media will be sent and posted to thousands upon thousands of people at a moment’s notice, which is incredibly important in a dense urban area such as LA county. The faster law enforce gives the proper information, the less amount of busybodies and innocents that will be in the way.
TWP finally address “Training and Equipment”. TWP is heavily enforcing and suggesting the idea of a 24/7 SEAL team-esque crew for terrorist actions. To have the firepower and training that terrorists would have would even the odds, and more importantly, bring situations to a close faster. Though the numbers of MACTAC personnel aren’t that much in the long run, having a spread out, capable force able to meet one sided odds (terrorists with rifles against people walking around a mall) is more than enough to allow time for relief to reach aid. TWP and by extension HSAC Los Angeles heavily push for armed, law enforcement resistance for terrorist actions in the heart of the southland. Enter the LAPD and LASD, who have teamed up with other police organizations and some powerful groups in Washington to provide training and informational sessions to it’s members on what to do in these events.
TWP ends with suggestions on how to further evolve operations against terrorism in the southland. Overall, the solutions and suggestions are always temporary. We can never be one step ahead of lone wolves or organizations. The HSAC of Los Angeles is seemingly trying to put itself out on the frontlines of today’s 21st century terrorism. Truth is, we can never be too sure of what they are capable of. And of course, in response to that, HSAC of Los Angeles is preparing southern California as best as they can. HSAC of Los Angeles and this white paper overall are a huge boon and benefit in protecting California, and the nation as a whole.
This is Mr.Fatso speaking... 